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Abstract— Future satellite missions like Earth Observation,
Telecommunication or any other kind are likely to be exposed
to various threats aiming at exploiting vulnerabilities of the
involved systems and communications. Moreover, the growing
complexity of systems coupled with more ambitious types of
operational scenarios imply increased security vulnerabilities in
the future. In the paper we will describe an architecture and
software elements to ensure high level of security on-board a
spacecraft. First the threats to the Security Partition Com-
munication Controller (SPCC) will be addressed including the
identification of specific vulnerabilities to the SPCC. Further-
more, appropriate security objectives and security requirements
are identified to be counter the identified threats. The security
evaluation of the SPCC will be done in accordance to the Com-
mon Criteria (CC). The Software Elements for SPCC has been
implemented on flight representative hardware which consists of
two major elements: the I/O board and the SPCC board. The
SPCC board provides the interfaces with ground while the I/O
board interfaces with typical spacecraft equipment busses. Both
boards are physically interconnected by a high speed spacewire
(SpW) link.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Current satellite missions that require security are protected
through their Telemetry (TM)/TeleCommand (TC) gateways.
Their on-board architecture is specifically designed and eval-
uated for security, e.g. resources are duplicated such that
on-board data is physically separated into individual classi-
fication domains. A common example of this approach is
the implementation of TM/TC crypto services in dedicated
hardware devices. As a consequence security introduces an
overhead in terms of mass, volume and power for spacecraft
design. A higher level of integrating software applications
by means of secure partitioning can reduce these penalties
while incorporating the advantages of software to security
functions typically implemented in hardware (Application
Specific Integrated Ciruit (ASIC) or Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) based crypto units).
2. USE CASE EARTH OBSERVATION
The requirements for the implementation of the Software
Elements for Security - Partition Communication Controller
(SPCC) were derived from typical space use cases like earth
observation, telecommunication and hosted payloads [5]. In
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this paper we describe only one use case from earth observa-
tion.
The Pleiades and SPOT missions are both responsible for
collecting earth images, storing and forwarding to the ground.
The first SPOT mission launched was in 1986, with more
satellites and upgrades improving both the resolution and re-
sponsiveness of the network. The Pleiades spacecraft provide
the ability to monitor the same point on the earth at 45 minute
intervals due to the spacecraft being 180 degrees apart in the
same orbit. The data acquired is used for:
• Regular monitoring
• Environmental monitoring
• Disaster monitoring
SPOT scenes cover a geographical area of 60km x 60km,
whilst the Pleiades images cover areas up to 100km x 100km.
The image data is stored on board in a 90 Gbit memory, and
passed to the ground via a 100Mbps data down-link.
Reference Architecture
We describe here the system architecture of a typical earth-
imaging spacecraft. This is broadly representative of the
typical architecture of many Earth Observation spacecraft
systems. Two classes of TM/TC links are present:
• Platform TM/TC for spacecraft command and monitoring
• Payload TM/High speed telemetry from a payload
The functional elements of the Earth Observation satellite
mission are shown in Figure 1, which shows the reference
system to be considered. The elements shown as relevant to
the current threat assessment include the space segment and
the Radio Frequency (RF) communication links. The Ground
Segment links are excluded in this document, as it is assumed
that a similar threat analysis would be carried out for ground
systems.
The space segment consists of two sections: the platform and
the payload.
Spacecraft Platform—The platform is controlled and moni-
tored by the Platform Operator using a Control Facility on
the ground. For the purpose of the study, we can consider the
platform to be comprised of three main elements:
• Tracking, Telemetry and Command (TT&C) Subsystem -
Receives TC and transmits Bus Telemetry (BTM) to and from
the Control Station
• Control and Data Handling Subsystem - Handles and dis-
tributes commands and data throughout the Platform and
Payload
• Platform Subsystems - Perform Platform Operations (e.g.
Attitude and Orbit Control (AOCS))
An on-board data-handling network is used to distribute TC
and TM throughout the spacecraft.
Spacecraft Payload—The operation and requirements of the
payload depend upon the specific mission. All command
and control of the payload are performed via the spacecraft
platform. This is the case on the majority of Earth Observa-
tion missions, and we use it as a template for our analysis
of missions of this type. The User Facilities receive the
imaging payload data, via the payload data-handling network
interfaced to spacecraft payload telemetry transponder. In this
case, the payload subsystem is responsible for:
Figure 1. Functional elements of Space and Ground
Segments
• Transmitting high-speed Payload Telemetry (PTM) or mis-
sion data to the User Facility
• Communication links: Reception of telecommands rele-
vant for payload send from Control Station to SpaceCraft
(S/C) platform (TC) and then forwarded via on-board subnet,
Payload health telemetry (BTM) forwarded to S/C platform
and from there to Control Station
Reference security architecture
Within the ground segment, TM/TC security services are
provided by a TC/BTM Crypto Unit, and the protection of
the imaging data is provided by a separate PTM Crypto Unit
(Figure 2).
The image data in the Memory Management Unit (MMU)
consists of data for a number of end-users. Encryption
services are provided by a on-board dedicated hardware unit,
where one section protects the low speed TC and BTM flows.
The PTM encryption section provides high-speed encryption
protection for all users’ imaging data (PTM). There is a need
to keep imaging data for different customers apart, due to a
variety of reasons. For example there may be a commercial
reason in that only one customer has ordered a specific image;
or there may be an operational separation need, such as that
identified on another earth observation mission, Earthcare,
where 2% of the data is used for internal consumption only,
and 26% and 72% of the data is distributed amongst two
different user groups / levels.
The spacecraft receives Consultative Committee for Space
Data Systems (CCSDS) compliant telecommand and emits
telemetry, therefore the following appropriate security ser-
vices are identified:
• Telecommand authenticity, confidentiality, integrity.
• Telecommand replay protection.
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Figure 2. Block Diagram of Crypto Flight Unit and the Ground Communication Links
• Telemetry confidentiality.
• Key management for platform TT&C services.
• Image confidentiality protection.
• (Image integrity is provided, but not required as a security
service).
• Key management for image data, i.e. selecting the appro-
priate key to protect the data for the appropriate end-user.
Due to the high data rates, a hardware solution for the Image
Security is currently unavoidable. The high-speed PTM en-
cryption function requires a key management which is tightly
associated with the capture and storage of the images, such
that the appropriate keys are used for the appropriate images.
Depending on the mission needs, the TM/TC Security is im-
plemented in either hardware or software. Government mis-
sions typically require hardware implementation to address
crypto algorithm integrity and key material confidentiality
concerns. Also, since the TC/BTM crypto function is part of
the vital spacecraft command chain, hardware solutions may
be required for reliability reasons.
3. BASIC CONCEPTS
Software partitioning and message communication
Higher levels of integration can be achieved by executing
independent software modules isolated within partitions on
the same computing node [13]. Time and Space Partitioning
(TSP) enables the separation of concerns such as safety,
performance and schedulability between functionally inde-
pendent software applications to contain and/or isolate faults
and reduce the effort of the software integration, verification
and validation process.
A separation kernel is responsible for enforcing the temporal
and spatial isolation of the partitions, where a partition is a
dedicated set of computing resources (memory, CPU time,
IO) allocated to a specific application. The kernel executes in
supervisor mode while the applications within the partitions
typically execute in user mode 1.
1TSP supports the concept of privileged partitions where applications ex-
ecute in supervisor mode with higher access rights to kernel services and
hardware resources
Partitions are able to only utilise message-based Inter Process
Communication (IPC) 2.
Adding Security to the TSP Software Architecture
Originally a safety-motivated concept, time and space parti-
tioning of software applications brings an increased capabil-
ity of dependability and integrity in the avionics system since
it prevents access to a given resource by a non-authorized
application, either by technical fault, operator error or envi-
ronmental effects.
As such TSP is complementary to the Multiple Independent
Levels of Safety and Security (MILS) concept [18], where
the original focus is on separation of security concerns such
as confidentiality or privacy.
Combining the two approaches, to which we will refer to as
secure partitioning, flight software applications can then be
hosted on a single platform with guaranteed non-interference,
resilience against malicious actions, while still maintaining
the mission safety needs. Security mechanisms can therefore
be added to the flight software to ensure the protection of
the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the software
system. A minimal trusted computing base can be identified,
the secure separation kernel, which enforces the security
properties, as shown in Figure 3.
Secure partitioning will protect the integrity, availability and
confidentiality of data and programs within each partition and
the separation kernel. However data that is communicated
via IPC across the partition boundaries cannot have all of its
security properties assured by the secure separation kernel.
In order to maintain a minimum trusted computing base, i.e.
keep the functionality of the kernel to the smallest possible,
formally verifiable set of functionality, it only controls the
setup of channels between partitions. The kernel should
therefore not contain code governing content of the data
communicated via IPC. A safe and secure design employing
only a secure separation kernel in practice will have to limit
channels to exist between partitions of the same security clas-
sification and safety criticality levels. This is the result of the
2IPC is defined as communication between two or more partitions executing
either on the same processor/core or on different processors/cores
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Figure 3. Security and Partitioning
combination of the multi-level security Bell-LaPadula ruleset
no read up; no write down for maintaining confidentiality
when communicating between elements of different security
classification and the Biba ruleset no read down; no write
up for communication between elements of different integrity
criticality [3] [4].
Secure Partitioning as such does not prohibit reconfiguring
the set of established communication channels. The recon-
figuration has to be done in a secure fashion, e.g. switching
between a fixed set of different configurations, which all need
to adhere to the restrictions outlined in the paragraph above.
The key point here is that the secure partitioning kernel can
and does govern the existence of channels, but indeed it does
not govern the content.
Therefore, a set additional software components is needed
to provide mechanisms for data to be safely and securely
transferred between applications that reside in partitions of
different classification or criticality levels and to the external
system, i.e. devices. This set of additional components we
term Secure Partition Communication Controller (SPCC). It
includes mechanisms such as routing (SPCC-R), encryption
(SPCC-E), content checking (SPCC-CC) for data transfers
to partitions of lower confidentiality classification or parti-
tions of higher integrity criticality as well as mechanisms
implementing efficient, safe and secure access to multiple
communication channels (Input Output Module (IOM)).
Adding security to the TSP development process
A process and role description has been defined for all stake-
holders involved in developing a partitioned software system
for spacecraft avionics. A detailed description can be found
in [12].
With TSP, security can be incorporated either within the
application itself by the Application Supplier, or at the Sys-
tem Integrator level. In the former case, the application
supplier must be aware of the confidentiality levels of all
applications and devices their application is communicating
with. They can then filter or downgrade their messages
appropriately. This would create a dependency between
applications meaning that a modification in the confidentiality
level of a destination application could induce a change
to the source application. In addition, this close binding
between applications would reduce the opportunity for re-use
of applications.
The alternative approach where security is handled under the
responsibility of the system integrator requires messages to be
adapted while they are being exchanged between partitions of
different criticality and classification. The source application
would be unaware that its messages have been modified,
and the destination application would receive a message that
it is appropriate for its confidentiality and integrity level.
This concept of adjusting the integrity and confidentiality of
messages passed between different entities is well discussed
in the Introduction section of [22]. Therefore, the system
integrator (not the application partition developer) configures
the channel connections as well as security mechanisms such
as redaction or encryption within a processor and the channel
connections between a processor and components external to
the processor.
4. DEFINITION OF ANALOGOUS SPCC-BASED
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
By analogy to the security architecture presented in the previ-
ous sections, we consider a system where the hardware Cryp-
tographic Flight Unit is partially replaced by a software-based
Security Partition Communication Controller (SPCC). In
addition to implementing the cryptographic functions for the
low-speed TC/BTM flows, software security functions can
also be used to manage complex key management, thereby
reducing implementation complexity for the remaining high-
speed PTM security functionality. In addition, an I/O module
is foreseen to separate the cyclic and event driven data aqui-
sition/distribution from the TSP-based SPCC.
Furthermore, the SPCC data redaction functionality intro-
duced earlier shall be employed. In order to provide a re-
alistic scenario, sample applications shall be able to transmit
messages of mixed confidentiality, i.e., a confidentiality, or
a clearance level shall be allocated to each parameters in
the message, instead of to the overall. This shall mean that
parameters in a message can be of different confidentiality
levels so the message needs to be filtered by the SPCC at
parameter level. Consequently applications receive messages
containing parameters appropriate for their clearance level
and parameters containing higher classified data are censored.
In the reference use case described before, one or more of
the spacecraft payload imaging equipments is capable of
capturing image data that has sensitivities pertaining to a
specific user, or group of users. The resulting data must be
inaccessible to other applications. As the Image Security is
implemented in a hardware solution, it is assumed that it is
being managed by a software application which is running on
the SPCC-based processor. The communications between the
application and the hardware security function (which would
be a peripheral on the payload spacewire interface) must be
kept separate from other pieces of hardware and software,
and it must not be possible for other pieces of hardware
and software to communicate or control the Image Security
hardware function.
The flight software security module (SPCC) operates as mul-
tiple software modules within separate partitions of the On-
board Computer which is equipped with a secure separation
kernel. Separate modules would provide encryption and
decryption capabilities for satellite TC, BTM and support
the external security aspects of the PTM hardware encyption
device. The respective modules of the SPCC would loaded
with initial keys, with operational keys being delivered to
the equipment over-the-air (OTAR). It is operated within a
CCSDS compatible system, using a Security Layer within
the communication protocol to enable the decryption and
encryption capabilities. No fundamental changes would be
necessary to the architecture of the ground security elements.
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The following features are required:
• Telecommand decryption and authentication capability for
all telecommands received by the spacecraft.
• Telecommand replay protection for all telecommands re-
ceived by the spacecraft.
• Telemetry encryption capability for all telemetry passed
through the SPCC, including security audit data generated
internally.
• Key delivery to as well as general management such as
scheduling of high-speed payload data encryption hardware
for various end-users or groups depending on the customer.
• Capability to securely change and update of key material
throughout the operational life of the SPCC.
• Secure internal control to ensure correct operation of the
SPCC, the IO Module and the secure separation kernel
throughout its operational life.
The end to end security architecture (Figure 5) considered
replaces the On-board Computer (OBC) in Figure 2 with the
OBC shown in Figure 4 and remove the TC/BTM section of
the on-board crypto units. The purpose of using the on-board
security architecture containing SPCC would be to:
• Allow more efficient implementation of the on board
TT&C crypto unit, by reducing the need for separate hard-
ware instantiation of resources for on board computer and
security unit
• Securely implement the on board computer, restricting
the required security evaluation / validation to the modules:
SPCC-E, SPCC-CC, secure separation Kernel, I/O module.
The standard flight software functions like AOCS, data-
handling would not need to be evaluated.
• Isolate flight software functions operated by different roles
into separate secure partitions, to increase e.g. confidentiality
of event-driven payload planning vs routine platform opera-
tions.
• Likewise, a hosted payload’s data management functions
and TC/BTM routing could be isolated without requiring
additional computer hardware.
In order to be able to recover from unforseen circumstances
(e.g. data corruptions), and prevent spacecraft lock-outs, the
on-board security architecture containing SPCC would:
• Carry initial / fall-back key material, state and configura-
tion vectors in non-volatile memory only accessible by the
partition dedicated to each particular security function.
• Detect data corruptions which would result in lock-out, and
recover autonomously.
• Provide protection mechanisms to ensure that these recov-
ery techniques cannot be initiated maliciously (e.g. a hosted
application hogging the processor resulting in a system time-
out and fall-back).
• Provide security functions with a strength of implemen-
tation comparable to a standalone hardware/software imple-
mentation.
The spacecraft TT&C link is critical to the successful op-
eration of the spacecraft, and loss of the link results in loss
of the mission. Processors and software are historically less
trusted for system critical applications than purely hardware
solutions, because of their inherent complexity, caused in
part by the huge number of interfaces required to provide
the desired functionality. Secure time ans space partitioning
offers mechanisms to increase robustness which go beyond
traditional approaches to increase the reliability of software
such as the installation of hardware monitors and watchdogs,
Figure 4. OBC Architecture
or the parallel development of the same application by two
completely independent teams / companies.
The additional benefit of TSP lies in the ability to offer
partitions as highly isolated compartments with very low
internal complexity, into which singular critical functions can
be implemented. With sufficient maturity of the secure sepa-
ration kernel and the ability to reallocate such small, critical
partitions to different cores of a high-reliability, multi-core
CPU, this study assumes that critical functions like TC de-
coders or TC/TM crypto units, which today are implemented
in a complex, hot redundant ASIC or FPGA either external or
internal to the traditional OBC, can achieve similar reliability.
Description of the major Elements
Core Module (SPCC-R)—The SPCC-R shall be functionally
similar to a router for inter-partition communication within
a Time and Space Partitioned (TSP) system, as illustrated
below. It enables authorised transmission of data between
applications of different integrity and/or confidentiality by
assuring that such data in transition is first forwarded to
a SPCC-CC Content Checking function. The SPCC-R is
the only element in entire architecture that has the ability
to route communication between the partitions of differing
confidentiality/integrity levels, because partitions of the same
level are permitted to communicate directly via IPC by the
secure partitioning kernel. All other partitions have to com-
municate via the SPCC-R (see Figure 4). As a consequence,
the partitions can be unaware of the other partitions in the
system because they are only aware of the SPCC-R. This
encourages portability of applications. The desired properties
of the SPCC-R are listed below:
• The SPCC-R must contain the routing table for all inter-
partition communication between differing confidentiality
and/or integrity levels so that it can correctly forward mes-
sages from a source partition to the destination partition,
while guaranteeing that intermittend message redaction is
performed by the appropriate SPCC-CC instance.
• In addition to regulating data flows between partitions,
SPCC-R shall be able to route data flows towards other
physical entities by forwarding them to physical communi-
cation interfaces, either directly via a local device driver,
or indirectly via a channel to a partition implementing a
device driver in isolation, or via offloading these external
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Figure 5. End to End Security Architecture between SPCC and the Ground Communication Links
communications to an IO Module.
• The routing mechanism shall allow priority channels to be
used to reduce the time taken to transfer messages.
• All communication between applications shall be based
on Packet Utilization Standard (PUS) [9], or similar , data
protocols. This shall allow the application suppliers to deliver
an application complete with Spacecraft Database. The
System Integrator shall then be able to add confidentiality and
integrity properties to the TM/TC parameters in Spacecraft
Database. The SPCC-CC guard mechanism shall then use
these confidentiality and integrity characteristics to determine
what actions (i.e. enforce integrity or downgrading confiden-
tiality) needed to be performed on the messages.
• The routing table can be updated in-flight. This allows
the SPCC-R to be reconfigurable without affecting the un-
derlying configuration of the separation kernel. The sepa-
ration kernel specifies the allowed communication channels
between partitions. Thereby the overall security and integrity
protection responsibilities are split between the SPK which
governs the fundamental security and integrity classification
of each partition and can enable direct communication be-
tween equal levels, and the SPCC-R which regulates filtered
communications required between levels.
– Like for a secure separation kernel, each indivitual con-
figuration variant must have been assessed to conform with
security and safety requirements.
– Like a secure separation kernel, SPCC-R reconfiguration
may only be triggered by Failure Detection, Isolation and
Recovery (FDIR) or authorized commands.
– The SPCC-R implementation must be independent of the
separation kernel technology.
• A hierarchical error handling strategy shall be used to
resolve anomalies locally within the SPCC. If the SPCC-R
as a master module cannot resolve its own errors, or those
of SPCC-CC or SPCC-E, then the error is passed to the next
higher level of spacecraft FDIR.
Content Checker (SPCC-CC)—The SPCC-CC shall ensure
that confidentiality and integrity is preserved by guarding all
data exchanges while being transparent to the application(s).
• SPCC-CC shall be executable in a separate partition from
SPCC-R, for maximum separation of security concerns.
• The SPCC-CC shall implement a mechanism to downgrade
the confidentiality of data communicated from a high confi-
dential to an application of lower confidentiality.
• The SPCC-CC shall implement a mechanism to enforce
data integrity for messages passed between a low criticality
application to a higher criticality application.
Encryption/Decryption Service (SPCC-E)—
• SPCC-E shall be executable in a separate partition from
SPCC-R, to achieve a strength of implementation similar to a
dedicated crypto device.
• Multiple instances of SPCC-E shall co-exist, providing cry-
pographic services for different data flows owned by different
operator roles, e.g. platform TC and BTM vs telecommands
for SPCC-R to change configuration vs telecommands di-
rected at SPCC-E to e.g. distribute new keys
• Each of these instances shall be able able to store its
own initalisation key material, so that the secure separation
kernel’s memory access control mechanisms shall provide
“natural” isolation for this sensitive data.
Input/Output Module— In order to reduce the overhead of
servicing Input/Output (I/O), e.g. polling the devices on
the software partitions, the aeronautical domain has adopted
dedicated IO handling hardware modules that are additional
hardware computing modules to the main processor platform.
These IO modules buffer the data from the communications
network and make the data available to the partitions via
SPCC-R. This can remove the need for specific IO gateway
partitions thereby improving the performance on a partitioned
system. The IOM can be an additional module within the on-
board computer or a dedicated data collector similar to the
Remote Interface Unit (RIU)/Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)/
Remote Data Concentrator (RDC) units used on spacecrafts
or aircrafts.
The IOM shall take responsibility for servicing IO away
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from the partitions. Access to the IOM should be restricted
and one approach to ensure security is that the access is
only via the SPCC. This would mean that all IO traffic
is routed via the SPCC-R to and from the IOM and the
other partitions. The SPCC would then use its routing table
to exchange the IO traffic between the IOM Port and the
source/destination application Ports. The IOM would be
responsible for performing any data formatting in order to
prepare the message for transmission along the specific IO
bus, e.g. apply SpaceWire headers or copy the data into
the correct MIL1553 message or reading/setting data directly
from/to digital or analog channels.
In a system with minimal or no confidentiality concerns,
applications could communicate directly with IOMs without
the need for the SPCC. This would enable prompt and timely
access to the IO traffic within the applications own time
partition.
5. THREAT ASSESSMENT
The Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation is an international
standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer security certifica-
tion. It is currently in version 3.1 revision 4 [2]. Common
Criteria is a framework in which computer system users can
specify their security functional and assurance requirements
(SFRs and SARs respectively) through the use of Protection
Profiles (PPs), vendors can then implement and/or make
claims about the security attributes of their products, and
testing laboratories can evaluate the products to determine
if they actually meet the claims. In other words, adherence
to Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of
specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer
security product has been conducted in a rigorous, standard
and repeatable manner at a level that is commensurate with
the target environment for use.
The CC provide a framework for assessing a security system,
and specifically provides a set of areas that should be consid-
ered such as Security Audit, Communication, Cryptographic
Support, User Data Protection, Identification and Authentica-
tion, Security Management, Privacy, Protection of Target of
Target of Evaluation Security Functionality (TSF), Resource
Utilisation, Target Of Evaluation (TOE) Access, Trusted
Path/Channels. Within each area, a number of functions and
requirements are identified within CC. All the applicable
requirements and functions for flight software are considered
in this document.
The Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) (EAL1 through
EAL7) of a system is a numerical grade assigned following
the completion of a Common Criteria security evaluation
(see Table 1). The increasing assurance levels reflect added
assurance requirements that must be met to achieve Common
Criteria certification.
Table 1. EAL Definition
Level Description
EAL 1 Functionally Tested
EAL 2 Structurally Tested
EAL 3 Methodically Tested and Checked
EAL 4 Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed
EAL 5 Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed
EAL 6 Semi-formally Verified Design and Tested
EAL 7 Formally Verified Design and Tested
The CC defines security functional components to be consid-
ered for the development of secure systems in CC part 2. Part
3 of CC identifies the assurance requirements that the secure
system must meet for the purpose of CC evaluation.
A threat assessment is used to determine the threats that are
relevant to the current reference system as discussed and
to attempt to quantify those threats. The threat assessment
considers the threats to the reference system when there are
no cryptographic capabilities present, in order to determine
what threats a cryptographic processor is required to protect
against. Additional threats created by the presence and im-
plementation of a cryptographic processor within the system
are considered separately [7].
The first step in the threat assessment is to identify the
relevant threats. This has been done by using the generic
threat list provided by [1], to determine those threats that are
relevant to the system, referred to as the specific threats. A
list of the generic threats and the resulting specific applicable
threats to the reference missions from Earth Observation and
Telecom is presented in [7].
The TOE is then defined (see Section 6), to indicate the
boundary and contents of the security equipment being anal-
ysed and evaluated in this case, the components enforcing
security on board the spacecraft computer. The generic
threats are then detailed according to [2] to identify the
specific threats that must be countered by the TOE.
The identified specific threats are next mapped to a set of
Security Objectives, which will prevent the threat from oc-
curring if they are met.
Finally, we map a set of Security Requirements for imple-
mentation on the Target Of Evaluation, which will meet those
Security Objectives [5].
6. RESULTS
Target of Evaluation
The TOE has to be defined, to indicate the boundary and
contents of the security equipment being analysed and eval-
uated in this case, the components enforcing security on
board the spacecraft computer. The generic threats are then
detailed according to [2] to identify the specific threats that
must be countered by the Target of Evaluation. We then map
the identified specific threats to a set of Security Objectives,
which will prevent the threat from occurring if they are
met. Finally, we map a set of Security Requirements for
implementation on the Target Of Evaluation, which will meet
those Security Objectives.
The Security Target for the use of SPCC to implement a
Cryptographic Module comprises a set of flight software
security modules (SPCC-R and SPCC-E as introduced above)
designed to provide encryption and decryption capabilities
for satellite TC, BTM and a custom module to support the
management of the high-speed PTM hardware encryption
function. [6].
TOE identification: SPCC Cryptographic Processor + Sepa-
ration Kernel
Assurance Level: EAL4.
Key Words: Satellite Security, Telecommand Decryption,
Telemetry Encryption, OTAR.
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In Common Criteria terms the security target is Part 2 ex-
tended and Part 3 Conformant. The TOE is developed using
security functional components as defined in the Common
Criteria version 2.2 [2] part 2 and one explicitly stated
functional requirement, with the assurance components as
identified in part 3 of [2] for an assurance level of EAL4.
Threats to be countered by TOE
The TOE is required to assure the confidentiality and integrity
of telecommands and telemetry on a satellite control path in
order to support the availability of the control functions. This
section briefly describes the threats that have been identified
and which must be protected against, either by the TOE or
the security environment in which it operates. The value
of the assets to be protected depends upon the equipments
which use the control path and the particular services that
they provide. In the case of SPCC, the TOE is used in
the direct control path to protect the spacecraft platform and
SPCC payload control capabilities and its capacity to provide
flexible communications services. The general threats to
be countered are unauthorised access to the satellite control
functions to either
• Cause denial of service
• Use the spacecraft against the wishes of the Operator
• Gain information that the appropriate User does not wish
the aggressor to have
The specific threats that have been identified and need to be
countered by the TOE are listed in [7]. Some of the threats
are illustrated in Figure 6.
Validation Results
In section 6 the EAL to be achieved was defined to be four.
This means, the software need to be methodically designed,
tested and reviewed.
The software has been developed according to a tailored ver-
sion of the European Cooperation For Space Standardization
(ECSS) Software Engineering standard [10]. The amount of
source code that has been developed during the study is less
than 6000 Source Lines of Code (SLOC). The software has
been fully tested,i.e. 148 unit test cases, 46 system test cases
and 16 acceptance test cases covering specific threats [15].
The statement coverage figures are 93% for the SPCC com-
ponent itself and 100% for the processing services (SPCC-
E and SPCC-CC). The decision coverage is 94% for SPCC,
97% for SPCC-E and 100% for SPCC-CC. The requirements
coverage is 100% for 114 software requirements and 98 user
requirements. Approx. 80% of the requirements are verified
by testing. The remaining 20% are verified either through re-
view or inspection. The software has been validated on Leon4
platforms with equipments connected via typical interfaces
used on-board a satellite like SpaceWire and MIL1553. The
Leon4 is considered as next generation microprocessor for
space applications.
Considering these facts and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Technology Readiness Level
(TRL) definition [20] the SPCC software developed during
the European Space Agency (ESA) study has achieved a TRL
of five: System/subsystem/component validation in relevant
environment: Thorough testing of prototyping in representa-
tive environment. Basic technology elements integrated with
reasonably realistic supporting elements. Prototyping imple-
mentations conform to target environment and interfaces.
The performance figures obtained during testing with the
LEON4 board running at 200MHz are summarized hereafter:
IO overhead (i.e. time of execution of void IO call) is 0.12ms,
the avg. time it takes for a PUS packet to go from one
application to another via SPCC is 1.5ms, time of data
transfer between two SpW ports via the PikeOS SpW driver is
between 0.4ms and 0.43ms, depending on packet size (0 - 122
Byte) and maximum data transfer rate is approx. 2340kiB/s.
From the requirments given in [16] (1 OBC, 4 payloads, 10
TC and 20 TM packets per element, max. packet length 1024
bytes) a typical data rate of approx. 1230kiB/s is needed.
Thus, the demonstrator achieved the objectives.
7. THE DEMONSTRATOR
Overview
A demonstrator (Figure 11) has been developed to further
investigate and improve the security on-board a spacecraft.
As defined in [13] it consists of two modules:
• the OBC and
• the IOM
The OBC directly interface with the ground station (usually
via the TM/TC frontend) while the IOM interfaces with
the equipment busses like MIL1553 and SpaceWire. Both
modules are directly interconnected via a SpaceWire link.
As shown in Figure 7 each module consists of:
• Application Layer with
– Example applications of different confidentiality levels
– SPCC components
• Execution Platform with
– basic system and component support services typically
provided by the on-board data handling software
– separation kernel
– hardware (computer board)
Figure 7. Hardware and Software Layers of the
Demonstrator
In addition, system integrators and operators have to be
supported in
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Figure 6. Specific threats to be encountered by the TOE
1. assigning applications to resource partitions,
2. defining the physical communication channels between
resource partitions,
3. defining logical communication channels between appli-
cations of the same or different confidentiality levels.
4. placing resource partitions in time partitions,
5. generating the software image to be executed
The functionality for items 1,2,4 and 5 is provided by the tool
environment of the selected separation kernel, i.e. CODEO
for PikeOS.
For item 3 two additional tools have been developed in the
frame of this study:
1. to syntactically check the definition of the logical commu-
nication channels and their characteristics
2. to check the defined logical channels wrt. the physical
inter-partition communication channels provided by the sep-
aration kernel which were defined by the system integrator
The basic functionality of the toolset is described in the
following section.
Toolset
Overview—According to the Statement of Work (SOW) [13]
two tools were identified to support the SPCC generation
process with the following capabilities:
1. Generator: generation of the SPCC sourecode using
Extended Markup Language (XML) input files that specify
the Routing Table and clearance and integrity actions to be
performed on the message data.
2. Verifier: Checks the correct generation of the SPCC vs
XML files. It could include automatically generated test cases
that verify the SPCC Routing Table and filtering actions.
The Toolset is intended to be used in the following (or similar)
scenario:
1. System integrator prepares the routing tables and target
system configuration/integration project
2. The system configuration is validated
3. Routing tables are compiled (converted from XML to
MSCF)
4. The target system image is built, including the compiled
routing tables
5. The target system is deployed
When SPCC needs to be reconfigured on the fly, the following
has to be done:
1. The new routing table is compiled
2. The routing table is sent to SPCC via PUS packets
Typically, the Toolset will likely be integrated into the system
build scripts (Makefiles), so that the routing tables are recom-
piled when modified, and the target system configuration is
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validated at every system compilation.
The following two tools have been developed in the frame of
the study (see Figure 8):
1. Routing table compiler (spcc-rtc)
2. System configuration validator (spcc-validate)
These tools can be called any time will produce outputs solely
depending on the input files. The flow to generate valid
routing tables is shown in Figure 8. More details can be
obtained from [19].
A third tool has been developed (PUS Commander) in order
to provide an easy to use interface to the SPPC sending
telecommands to the SPCC and receiving telemetry data from
the SPCC.
Figure 8. Routing Table design flow
Execution Platform
Several options were investigated for the execution platform
in order to provide an optimal solution within the given time
and cost frame. This includes the hardware, the separation
kernel and the basic on-board software functionality.
Hardware—For the hardware several options were discussed:
• MultiDSP/uProcessor Architecture (MDPA) or SCOC3
processor boards (Airbus OBC products)
• On-Board Computer System Architecture (OBC-SA) High
Reliable Processing Board based on LEON4 ASIC (devel-
oped in the frame of an DLR contract)
• ESA Next Generation Microprocessor based on LEON4
(Cobham Gaisler evaluation board)
Finally, the GR-CPCI-LEON4-N2X Quad-Core LEON4
Next Generation Microprocessor Evaluation Board from
Gaisler [21] was selected (see Figure 9), mainly because of
the following reasons:
• The quad core CPU provides sufficient processing power
for software encryption
• The LEON4 comes with an MMU, i.e. hardware support
for space partitioning
• Stability of the board
• Availability of the hardware at reasonable costs
• Reusability of the hardware for other studies on multicore
architectures
In order to limit the effort for developing software for dif-
ferent execution platforms it was decided to use the same
hardware for both modules.
Figure 9. GR-CPCI-LEON4-N2X Board
Separation Kernel—Basically, there are two solutions avail-
able for the separation kernel:
• Pure Hypervisor, e.g. xTratum or AIR
• Virtualization platform incl. Real-Time Operating System
(RTOS), e.g. PikeOS, VxWorks653
We selected PikeOS, mainly because of the following rea-
sons:
• PikeOS includes a separation kernel and a mirco kernel
• PikeOS supports ARINC 653 compliant inter-partition
communication channels
• Board support package for LEON4 board is available
• Kontroller fuer autonome Raumfahrtsysteme (KARS) soft-
ware runs out of the box on PikeOS
Basic concepts of PikeOS—The concept of PikeOS combines
real-time operating system (acrtos), virtualization platform,
and Eclipse based integrated development environment (
Integrated Development Environment (IDE)) for embedded
systems. The PikeOS real time operating system has been
developed for safety-critical and security-critical applications
with certification needs in the fields of Aerospace & De-
fense, Automotive & Transportation, Industrial Automation
& Medical, Network Infrastructures and Consumer Electron-
ics. Functionality to provide a safe and secure environment
for critical applications is a vital part of the PikeOS core
components. Safety and security aspects have been accounted
in the PikeOS design. The PikeOS real time operating system
uses a modular approach as shown in Figure 10 to enable
system architectures tailored to individual projects needs and
to support an incremental certification process.
The main features and responsibilities of PikeOS are:
• Hardware abstraction (processor and platform)
• First level exception and interrupt processing
• Address space management
• Thread management and scheduling
• Communication and synchronization
• Resource management and protection with respect to re-
sources and processing time
10
Figure 10. PikeOS Architecture
• Health monitoring
• Inter-partition communication
• I/O device abstraction and access control
• File system support
Most of the features listed above are implemented by the
generic PikeOS Core. The PikeOS core consists of the
PikeOS Micro kernel and the PikeOS System Software
(PSSW).The generic part is, at source code level, independent
from the CPU architecture, and, at object code level, indepen-
dent from the underlying hardware platform.
Basic Services— For basic system and component support
services three options were investigated:
1. Writing basic functionality from scratch
2. Reuse and adaptation an Airbus inhouse product called
Core Data Handling System (CDHS)
3. Using KARS which has been developed by Airbus within
the frame of an DLR contract.
The third option was selected as KARS is a highly modular
software that can be easily configured for the purpose of the
study. KARS has been develeoped for usage on a separation
kernel and provides all basic PUS services.
Application - Software Components for Security
In the following only those components are briefly described
that were specifically developed for the purpose of the ESA
study. A detailed description of all components can be found
in [17].
SPCC-R— The Software Elements for Security - Partition
Communication Controller (SPCC-R) protects against unau-
thorized transmission of data between applications of differ-
ent integrity and/or confidentiality. The SPCC-R routes all
communication between the partitions of differing confiden-
tiality/integrity levels. Partitions of the same level can com-
municate directly via ARINC 653 queueing ports whereas all
other partitions have to perform authorized communications
via the SPCC-R, whose routing table setup will enforce
the necessery processing services required to make these
communications across security or safety domain boundaries
compliant with applicable policies.
In addition to allowing intra-partition communication be-
tween hosted payloads, SPCC-R also indirectly enables com-
munication of the partitions with the ground station. SPCC-R
serves as a router inside a software system (e.g. On-Board
Computer), providing optional processing security services
including content en/decryption and filtering of the commu-
nication. The main purpose is to control the inter-component
communication according to the configuration provided by
the system operator. SPCC uses the KARS framework for
the code to be independent on the host OS but it routes PUS
packets [9].
Processing Services (SPCC-E, SPCC-CC)— In case pro-
cessing of message contents is required (like encryption or
content validation), the message will be forwarded to ded-
icated processing modules. Forwarding rules for message
content processing are also defined within the routing table
of SPCC-R. SPCC-E component implements PUS packet
encryption/decryption service. SPCC-CC component imple-
ments a demonstration of PUS packet contents modification
and validation.
Sample Applications— APP1 is a specific application for
development and testing purposes on the SPCC node. It
implements dedicated PUS Services which allows testing of
SPCC functionality as well as benchmarking.
The PUSAPP component is pure KARS component which
accepts any PUS packets over dedicated queuing ports (via
the IO Handler (IOH)) and responds by TM(1,1) and TM(1,7)
if the TC Flags requires this.
Demonstrator Configuration
Figure 11 shows the hardware elements of the demonstra-
tor. The SpaceWire RMAP Responder (SRR) simulates
SpaceWire equipments and provides a bridge to connect the
PUS Commander through an ethernet connection to the OBC
node. The PUC Commander injects PUS commands into
the system and reads telemetry data from the OBC node.
Both, the OBC and IOM node are connected to the SRR as
well as directly connected to eachother via SpaceWire. The
IOM node has an additional interconnection to the MIL1553
equipment simulator.
Figure 11. Demonstrator Hardware Setup
The OBC hardware platform in this setup hosts the following
software elements (see also Figure 12):
• Separation kernel incl. Board Support Package (BSP) and
driver for SpaceWire: PikeOS
• Space specific Software System Specification (SSS) imple-
menting most PUS services (based on KARS [14])
• Component support services (CSS, tasking, ...) incl. the
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Operating System Abstraction Layer (OSAL)
• Secure Partitioning Communication Controller (SPCC-R)
• Encryption Service (SPCC-E)
• Content Checking Service (SPCC-CC)
• Sample Applications (APP1, PUSAPP)
• Equipment Handler for SpaceWire links between OBC and
IOM and for the TM/TC link to the simulated ground station
Figure 12. Demonstrator Node Configurations
The IOM node hosts a specific instance of the SPCC-R with
a IOM specific routing table called IOR together with the
equipment handlers for SpaceWire [11] and MIL1553 [8]
incl. the corresponding drivers (Figure 13).
Figure 13. Demonstrator Interconnection Scheme
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this report we presented a software architecture adding
security features to the on-board computer of satellites. This
is achieved by using Time and Space Partitioning with a sepa-
paration kernel and re-usable software components providing
enhanced message routing and en-/decryption capabilities.
The separation kernel ensures that applications remain within
the defined partition boundary. Communication paths be-
tween applications are defined by the system integrator based
on the security level for each application. The mechanisms
used are ARINC 653 compliant message queues. Thus,
the source application would be unaware that its messages
have been checked, and the destination application would
receive a message that it is appropriate for its confidentiality
level. These communication channels are defined when the
correspondig integration project is created. As this infor-
mation is compiled into the software, it is not possible to
establish additional channels during run-time. Thus, by-
passing the defined channels or reading memory areas of
other partitions is not possible. In the architecture we have
defined, the communication between applications of different
confidentiality levels goes through a specific router - the
Secure Partioning Communication Controller (SPCC). This
router checks the validity of the message and ensures that
only those information is passed to another application or
device that fulfills the security rules specified in the routing
table. In addition to the SPCC we have introduced an IOM.
This module takes away the responsibility for servicing IO
from the partitions. Access to the IOM is restricted and one
approach to ensure security is that the access is only via the
SPCC. This means that all I/O traffic is routed via the SPCC
to and from the IOM and the other partitions. The SPCC uses
its routing table to exchange the IO traffic between the IOM
Port and the source/destination application ports. The IOM
is responsible for performing any data formatting in order to
prepare the message for transmission along the specific IO
bus, e.g. apply SpaceWire headers or copy the data into the
correct 1553 message or reading/setting data directly from/to
digital or analog channels.
The architecture presented is based on the KARS framework
developed in the frame of an DLR contract aiming at missions
with a high level of autonomy. This framework provides
a full implementation of the PUS services (called System
Support Services) and provides an Application Programming
Interface (API) called Component Support Services to appli-
cation developers to reduce their development effort. The
underlaying OSAL is available for a number of operating
systems, e.g. PikeOS, VxWorks and Linux. Thus, porting
the entire software to another hardware platform is a matter
of the availability of the platform support package. Currently,
the software is available for x86, Leon4, PPC and ARM
platforms.
Especially, multicore platforms offer many advantages when
performance is an issue. For example, the encryption com-
ponent (SPCC-E) could be assigned to one (or more) CPU
allowing software en-/decryption in real-time. Thus, expen-
sive hardware in terms of power consumption and mass could
be eliminated.
To summarize, using Time and Space Partitioning, message
routing according to well defined rules and software en-
/decryption allows to combine safety and security features on
one platform. Thus, the additional costs when introducing
security on-board a satellite in terms of processing ressources,
mass, power consumption and development effort is limited.
The presented architecture will also allow to combine OBC
and IOM functionality on one computer board as shown in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Single Board Solution for SPCC
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